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ABSTRACT 
In the last 50 years, the study of groundwater governance has given birth to rich and differentiated 
analytical approaches. This article proposes an exchange between the main heuristic viewpoints, 
results and theses of three approaches which studied groundwater governance: the study of 
groundwater governance as collective action initiated by E. Ostrom, the analysis made by T. Shah on 
informal groundwater economies and the works of A. Prakash, A. Mukherji and T. Birkenholtz 
drawing on political ecology. The aquifers on which each approach originally built its analysis played 
a key role in the design of analytical frameworks which, in the case of the first two approaches, were 
later applied to a much larger set of cases. The three approaches share many commonalities in their 
heuristic methods. However, they differ in the content of governance systems recommended to 
achieve sustainable groundwater use, and especially in the benefits of involving water users in the 
implementation of governance. Therefore, they also differ on what should be the focus of academic 
analyses. It is thus of interest to organize joint readings of cases of groundwater governance and to 
discuss the contents of research programs able to provide fruitful analyses of these cases, based on 
local specificities.  
Key words: demand management, heuristic viewpoint, groundwater governance 
RESUME 
Durant les 50 dernières années, l’étude de la gouvernance des eaux souterraines a donné naissance à 
des approches analytiques riches et différenciées. L’article propose un échange entre les principaux 
points de vue heuristiques, les résultats et les thèses de trois approches qui ont étudiés la 
gouvernance des eaux souterraines : l’étude de la gouvernance des eaux souterraines vue comme 
action collective telle qu’initiée par E. Ostrom, l’analyse faite par T. Shah des secteurs économiques 
informels permis par l’usage des eaux souterraines et les travaux de A. Prakash, A. Mukherji et T. 
Birkenholtz qui se sont inspirés de l’écologie politique. Les aquifères pour lesquels chaque approche 
a été initialement conçue ont joué un rôle capital dans la conception d’un cadre d’analyse qui, pour 
les deux premières approches, a ensuite été mis en œuvre dans un grand nombre de cas. Les trois 
approches partagent de nombreux éléments de leurs méthodes heuristiques. Elles diffèrent 
cependant dans le contenu des systèmes de gouvernance préconisés pour permettre un usage 
durable des eaux souterraines, et en particulier en ce qui concerne le bénéfice d’impliquer les 
usagers dans la mise en œuvre de la gouvernance. De ce fait, ces approches diffèrent aussi sur ce que 
devrait être au cœur d’analyses académiques. Il serait ainsi intéressant d’organiser des lectures 
communes de cas de gouvernance des eaux souterraines et de discuter du contenu de programmes 
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de recherche qui permettent des analyses fructueuses de tels cas, en prenant en compte les 
spécificités locales.  
Mots clés: gestion de la demande, point de vue heuristique, gouvernance des eaux souterraines 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Groundwater has a particular position in studies of natural resources management. While the “social 
dilemmas” (Ostrom, 2007) inherent in the use of groundwater resources are broadly similar around 
the world, the contexts of the definition and implementation of institutions (understood here 
broadly as formal and informal rules and social norms) to face these dilemmas vary considerably. 
This diversity in the contexts encompasses the legal setting, the number of users, the costs of 
monitoring these uses, the means available to public organisations in charge of water resource 
management, the available information on groundwater resources, etc. Consider the huge difference 
between the case of a small group of large-scale groundwater users in California, whose direct 
negotiations receive technical support from state services, and the Indus plain, where public 
authorities with limited means face millions of small-scale farmers using unregistered wells and 
boreholes.  
Since the mid-1960s, many authors have studied the institutions established to access and possibly 
to manage the use of this resource. Among these studies, two approaches stand out as being 
particularly well-structured: the “Groundwater governance as collective action” approach, which 
developed its analyses around the figure of E. Ostrom and the analysis made by T. Shah of informal 
groundwater economies. A third group of authors (A. Prakash, A. Mukherji and T. Birkenholtz) do not 
form per se a school of thought but they share many commonalities in their studies of groundwater 
governance, in particular the use of a political ecology approach. While the analytic frameworks 
developed by these approaches were designed in specific contexts, the two first later matured into 
broader theories, aiming at covering a much larger set of situations.  
The three approaches share their willingness to analyse and understand situations of groundwater 
governance. However, few papers have identified links between these approaches. When such 
connections were made (e.g., Mukerji and Shah, 2005; Schlager, 2007), the authors rarely made an 
explicit comparison of the analytical frameworks and main theses nor did they position them face to 
face. At first sight, the approaches may appear disconnected and even to produce contradictory 
results. The aim of this article is to engage an exchange between the three approaches, through a 
comparative analysis of their main heuristic viewpoints, research programmes, results and theses. 
Here we make use of the concept of governance, even though its use for the analysis of natural 
resource management precedes the earliest works cited here. However, the ideas that this concept 
conveys have been debated and applied in surface and groundwater studies for many years. In fact, 
this concept is close to what V. Ostrom (1971) referred to as ”institutional arrangements”. 
Governance refers here to the wide spectrum of forms of coordination between actors for allocating 







THREE DISTINCT READINGS OF GROUNDWATER GOVERNANCE 
Groundwater governance as collective action: understanding the performance and robustness of 
institutions  
E. Ostrom is mostly known for her analysis of the governance of common pool resources. The 
international recognition of her works is mainly linked to the methodological approach she helped 
develop at the University of Indiana in the framework of the “Workshop in Political Theory and Policy 
Analysis” (the so called “Bloomington school”, Aligica and Boettke, 2009). Much less known is the 
fact that, at the beginning of her career, she studied groundwater management in southern 
California. 
Indeed, during her PhD in political science (Ostrom, 1965), she tried to understand the emergence of 
institutional arrangements made to govern a groundwater basin1 in the Los Angeles metropolitan 
area facing increasing salt water intrusion. She described the process of emergence of public 
enterprises designed to manage this issue and to provide related public goods and services. She also 
stressed the role of public entrepreneurs in the process. Whereas private entrepreneurs are free to 
follow their interests and to make a profit in a market-based system, the capacity of involvement of 
public entrepreneurs depends, more fundamentally, on the political system in which they operate, 
i.e., the set of rules that organizes life in society. Moreover, she explained the way institutional 
arrangements were negotiated between the stakeholders, and the technical and economic solutions 
which were suggested and implemented to pursue the development of the metropolitan area, in the 
context of risks generated by water scarcity.  
Thus, even if she did not refer to the debates, which were underway at that time concerning 
collective action2 or governance, she already insisted on the capacity of self-organisation of groups 
created to collectively manage a common problem. During the same period, Weschler (1968) was 
also working on groundwater management, in the same geographical area, but in different 
groundwater basins. He showed that different management solutions had been found by actors in 
situations that appeared to be quite analogous in climatic and organisational terms. Fifteen years 
later, this assessment of such a wide range of locally crafted institutions led Ostrom to ask W. 
Blomquist to make a detailed analysis of the management of four groundwater basins located in 
southern California. The aim was to analyse the way institutions were built and to understand the 
factors which influenced the variety of institutional responses, in quite similar situations (Blomquist, 
1987). Another important point of Blomquist’s work was to understand why many of these 
institutions had survived, i.e., the factors that contributed to the success and longevity of these 
institutions.  
The analysis was later expanded to four other groundwater basins in California (Blomquist, 1992). In 
almost all, local actors managed to draw up rules to ensure that groundwater uses matched 
recharge, and, in the case of coastal aquifers, prevented salt intrusion. Despite a wide range of 
negotiation processes and the variety of their outcomes in terms of management rules, these cases 
shared similar characteristics, such as their polycentrism and local control over groundwater 
governance. The performance of the management rules designed by groundwater users was 
assessed using three criteria: effectiveness, adaptability and equity. Only one of the cases analyzed 
                                                          
1
 Groundwater basin, aquifer and aquifer system will be used in this paper as synonymous.  
2
 The book by Mancur Olson (1965) was published during the same period. 
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by Blomquist was clearly a failure, whereas the others cases studied could more or less be 
considered as performing with regards to these criteria.  
This initial work was later followed, with some evolution in the research programme. Blomquist et al. 
(2004) assessed the legal frameworks, the judiciary decisions, and the collective actions for 
groundwater governance in the southwestern United States. They paid specific attention to the way 
institutional processes enable the conjunctive use and management of groundwater and surface 
water resources. More recently, Steed (2010) assessed the factors involved in the stability and 
evolution of the institutions for groundwater governance since the 1930s in some of the basins 
formerly studied by Blomquist.  
Ostrom often argued that using case-specific combinations of analytical methods would be more 
effective than attempting to devise a single method that would be relevant in all situations (Poteete 
et al., 2010). While pragmatism is thus acknowledged, the Bloomington school progressively 
stabilized a heuristic method at the interface between public economy (especially the public choice 
approach) and an institutional analysis built around the Institutional Analysis and Development 
framework (Aligica and Boettke, 2009). More recent developments of the Bloomington School 
research programme give more importance to the analysis of social ecological systems and of the 
factors which contribute to the performance and the robustness of the institutions (Steed, 2010). 
Robustness of a system refers to the maintenance of the performance of this system despite internal 
stress or external disturbance (Anderies et al., 2004). “Robust institutions (…) allow for changes in 
rules to respond to shocks, newly perceived threats, or changes in design objectives” (Steed, 2010: 
26). 
 
The original case studies were the first on a list that subsequently became much longer and 
concerned many more different types of common pool resources, to inform the general research 
programme of the Bloomington school. One of the goals of the programme was to define conditions 
under which common pool resource users are likely to set up sustainable management of these 
resources. This programme led to theses about the principles on which long-enduring rules for user-
managed common pool resources are generally based (Ostrom, 1990), as well as the conditions 
regarding the resource and the users’ characteristics which provide a favourable context to draw up 
such rules (Ostrom et al., 2000). Other analyses of cases involving users in groundwater governance 
later used these theses. Ross and Martinez-Santos (2010) found that the principles for user-based 
management rules provided a valuable insight of complex systems involving both users and the 
administration for the governance of aquifers in Australia and Spain. Lopez-Gunn and Martinez-
Cortina (2006) used the conditions regarding users’ characteristics to understand the performance of 
groundwater user associations in Spain and added to these conditions others on the attributes of 
higher-level authorities. 
Dynamics of informal groundwater economies: opportunities for practical policies 
T. Shah originally analysed the potential of informal groundwater markets for regional economic 
development in India (Shah and Raju, 1988). Later on, he expanded his analysis to the co-evolution of 
the economy created by intensive agricultural groundwater use and groundwater resources in South 
Asia. He revealed the extremely important role groundwater now plays in South Asian rural areas, 
but also the increasing fragility of these groundwater economies (Shah et al., 2003).  
Shah’s main thesis is that governance systems used for South Asian aquifers are not ripe for the 
Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) approach (Shah, 2009). Indeed, the three 
important pillars of the IWRM approach, namely water policy, law, administration, are currently not 
implementable, and consequently, the tools developed in such approaches are simply not 
practicable. For instance, the transaction costs of registering thousands of small-scale farmers would 
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be simply too high. Instead of continuing to try to implement a governance system based on IWRM 
principles, policies makers should be more pragmatic and look for mechanisms that account for the 
informality of the groundwater economies from the outset. These pragmatic approaches could be 
defined based on typologies of groundwater economies, particularly the characteristics of the 
aquifers. While groundwater recharge programmes are successful in hard rock aquifers, approaches 
based on more indirect demand management could be used in alluvial aquifers (Shah, 2012). An 
interesting example of such an approach is the Jyotirgram system in Gujarat, where the state set up a 
specific electrical network for agricultural water use, that meant water use could be controlled 
through the power supply. Shah et al. (2008) judged such initiatives to be successful in indirectly 
controlling water use while not harming the groundwater economy, thanks to an increase in the 
reliability of power supply.  
Shah later extended his research to other countries and in particular to comparisons with Mexico 
(Scott and Shah, 2004), China and Spain (Mukherji and Shah, 2005). Shah et al. (2007) proposed a 
worldwide assessment of groundwater use and management based on this conceptual and 
methodological construct, leading to a general typology of groundwater economies. While Shah 
stands as the core author of such an approach, other authors including Moench (2007) share his 
assessment that direct implementation of the formal management tools from the IWRM toolbox is 
not the best way to tackle groundwater overuse in developing countries. 
Political ecology of groundwater 
Here we bring together three authors: A. Prakash (2005), A. Mukherji (2006) and T. Birkenholtz 
(2009). Although they do not form a well-structured school of thought, their heuristic methods share 
many commonalities, and in particular they all draw much on political ecology, as proposed by 
Greenberg and Park (1994). Their approaches are also affiliated with Marxist political economy 
(Mollinga, 2010) and with Foucauldian analyses of power. 
The authors analysed aquifers which are intensively used for irrigation in India. The core focus of 
their work was to study groundwater as a contested resource within social and political arenas, both 
at village and state levels. First, they analysed the diversity of actors’ interests and resources, of the 
power relations, and of possible coalitions among actors. Second, they assessed the way 
groundwater governance (from farmer-to-farmer agreements to public policies) is designed, 
legitimized, implemented and possibly contested. Third, the consequences of farmers’ different 
abilities to access groundwater on their choices and on differentiation among farms were analysed.  
Prakash (2005) studied social differentiation as a consequence of groundwater overdraft in a village 
in Gujarat. He argued that decreasing water availability in the boreholes led to further differentiation 
between farmers, since the richest farmers, who were shareholders of collective boreholes, stopped 
selling surplus water to poorer farmers, who were thus compelled to farm on the richer farmers’ land 
under conditions that were unfavourable for them. In such conditions, supporting increased 
development of water transactions between farmers (for instance by setting up a low flat electricity 
tariff for water) may help reinforce the skewed distribution of the added value. Mukherji (2006) 
analysed the design and implementation of groundwater governance policies in West Bengal and 
Gujarat. The structure and power of farmers’ organisations and the political history of each state led 
to a situation in which there was no regulation of groundwater use in Gujarat, where groundwater 
was overexploited, whereas strict regulations were enforced in West Bengal, where only limited 
groundwater overdraft had been diagnosed. Finally, Birkenholtz (2009) analysed an institutional 
groundwater reform in Rajasthan. The aim of the reform, which was encouraged by the World Bank, 
was to establish stricter regulations and individual property rights. The government of Rajasthan 
attempted to convince farmers of the relevance of the reform. Elite farmers generally agreed with 
the reform, particularly because they thought they could influence local groundwater regulatory 
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bodies. By contrast, grassroots farmers were likely to see further limits imposed on their water use, 
while not having a voice in future decision-making on groundwater governance.  
All these studies identified flaws in several groundwater governance policies, such as regulation and 
water markets, which are widely considered to be good practices. The authors proposed limited – 
and different - arguments for improved groundwater governance. Birkenholtz (2009) argued that, to 
counter the top-down implementation of regulations for groundwater use, bottom-up accountable 
institutions could give more voice to marginalised farmers. By contrast, Mukherji (2006) considered 
that strong farmer organisations, at least like those that exist in Gujarat, did not help find solutions 
for the sustainable use of groundwater.  
 
COMPARING THE READINGS IN TERMS OF METHODS AND RESULTS  
Our comparison of the approaches is structured in terms of the original cases studied, the 
components of the governance system that were analysed, the domain of validity of each approach, 
the heuristic methods and the suggested implications of the research results. To facilitate the 
comparison, the three approaches are summarized in Table 1. 
The structuring role of the original case studies 
Even though two of the three approaches were used worldwide, the analytical frameworks and 
research objects were initially based on in-depth investigations of specific case studies taking place in 
quite different contexts. First, the authors of the Bloomington School built their analysis in the 
southwestern United States, where many (mainly urban) groundwater users are able and willing to 
participate in designing groundwater management rules. Moreover, the Californian and federal 
administrations provided support for negotiations in the form of hydrogeological data, generally 
accepted locally designed agreements and monitored implementation of agreed upon rules. In 
contrast, South Asia, where the two other approaches were built, is characterised by numerous 
informal small-scale (mainly rural) groundwater users who have no voice in the decision-making 
process, public authorities who have not the capacity to directly monitor groundwater uses, and 
most of the time, a very weak de facto enforcement of legal regulations. Moreover, in South Asia, the 
power inequalities between the farmers themselves, and between farmers and the local elite and the 
state administration, are much larger than in California. These differences in the original case studies 
played a key role in the differences in the analysed components of effective governance and in the 
heuristic methods chosen.  
Different elements analysed to achieve effective governance 
The Bloomington school and Shah agree on the least that what can be expected from governance is 
that the aquifer should not be overused3. We denote governance systems that enable such 
sustainable use as “effective”. The authors making use of political ecology generally do not provide a 
definition of effective governance, because the outcomes of the social processes they study are 
usually not compared with a situation of reference. The aim of their approach is more to deconstruct 
the proposed solutions. Thus, these authors focus more on understanding failures to reach effective 
governance. 
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Table 1. Comparison of the three approaches used to study groundwater governance 
  Groundwater governance 
as collective action 
Dynamics of informal 
groundwater economies: 
opportunities for practical 
policies 
Political ecology of 
groundwater 
Geographical location of 
the initial analysis  
Southern California South Asia India 
Some case studies for 
which the analytical 
framework was later used 
U.S. (Arizona, Colorado, 




Focus of the analysis The links between the characteristics of the resource-
actors system and the outcomes in terms of governance 
The process through which 
governance is set up 
Main subject of study  Institutional development: 
Collective action and rules 
for self-governing aquifer 
systems 
Groundwater economy  Political coalitions 
Method of analysis Many cases, in order to 
extract generic theses 
which explain the 
performance and 
robustness of institutions 
Many cases, in order to 
produce typologies of 
situations 
Case study approaches. 
Sometimes comparison, 
but no attempts at 
generalisation 
Elements studied to 
account for how 
governance is achieved 
 
Management rules and 
characteristics of the 
resource and the actors 
which increase the 
likelihood of cooperation 
between users 




Governance as a case-
specific result of 
coalitions of actors 
Main principles behind 




involvement of users in 
groundwater management 
Principles that rules used 
in enduring self-organized 
governance systems are 
likely to be based on 
Opportunities for 
pragmatic and indirect 
approaches  
  
No attempt to define 
“effective governance”  
 
Proposed use of these 




obstacles that have to be 




management objectives and 
approaches which depend 
on the original 
characteristics and 
constraints 
Generally not an objective 






Where the Bloomington school and Shah differ is in the main elements they consider to ensure 
effective governance, in particular: i) the participation of water users and ii) tools for demand 
management. Ostrom (1990) gave special importance to the participation of water users and argued 
that common-pool resource users should take part in the design of management rules, against 
theories advocating state management or privatisation4. And indeed, three out of the four aquifer 
management cases she reviewed showed that such participation enabled sustainable long-term use 
of the aquifer. In the cases she reviewed, governance involved the formally defined regulation of 
water uses and especially control of individual water consumption. Apart from showing that their 
costs were reasonable in the local context, she did not conduct an in-depth analysis of the 
management tools used, since they were not a hotly debated issue. In a sense, Ostrom’s analysis is 
focused on the conditions of the design of a governance system for groundwater resources that 
involves users in the decision-making. Schlager confirmed this position when she claimed that “a 
growing body of groundwater case studies demonstrates that groundwater users are capable of 
devising solutions to common pool resource dilemmas that are local in nature.” (Schlager, 2007: 
149). Constraints were analysed to see how they could be overcome to reach participatory 
management involving direct demand management. Ostrom also looked (followed later by 
Blomquist, 1992, and Steed, 2010) at the performance of the institutions that were created. Thus, 
even if the Bloomington school does not look at the efficiency of the governance structures (in the 
economic sense of the term), it is interested in the performance and robustness of institutions 
governed by water users.  
Shah (2009), on the other hand, focused on the tools for demand management and paid particular 
attention to management tools that are (in)compatible with the informality of groundwater uses. 
The way he took initial constraints into account is thus radically different from the Bloomington 
school’s approach: Shah started from the analysis of the constraints that prevent effective 
governance of groundwater - in the sense of using the IWRM toolkit (Shah, 2009), and then 
considered what could be done. Given that many constraints may not be removed, at least in the 
short term, in South Asia, governance systems should be designed to adapt to these constraints. 
Incidentally, he considered that farmers are often not interested or able to play a prominent role in 
monitoring groundwater uses, and gave a bleak account of attempts to let farmers control their own 
water uses in both developed and developing countries.  
Increasing overlap in the proposed “domains of validity” 
Both Ostrom and Shah acknowledged that other approaches may be valid in contexts that differ from 
those they investigated in their original analyses. Nevertheless, they also used their analytical 
framework in much broader contexts than was originally the case, leading to an increasing overlap in 
the proposed “domains of validity” of the three approaches. Such overlap is expected to increase 
because the number of cases of groundwater governance involving some form of user participation is 
also likely to increase. In contrast, the three authors inspired by political ecology were focused on 
groundwater governance in India. While political ecology was also used to study aquifers in other 
countries, there has been no attempt of generalisation. This increasing overlap leads to two major 
differences in the readings of cases of groundwater governance. 
                                                          
4
 The Bloomington school did not compare the efficiency between groundwater governance systems where users are 
involved and where they are not. They undertook such analysis on irrigation systems whose results were favourable to 
users’ involvement (Lam, 1998).  
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First, Shah (2009) acknowledged that formalized groundwater governance can succeed in developed 
countries, but pointed out that the results of initiatives for regulation of groundwater uses in the 
developed countries concerned were at best lukewarm. In particular, while Ostrom (1990) 
considered that the governance systems set up in California had proved their capacity to ensure 
sustainable use of the aquifers (an analysis confirmed by Steed, 2010), Shah argued that the aquifers 
were much better protected by supply management than by actual regulation of groundwater uses, 
and that these aquifers are islands of management in a sea of open access situations in all aquifers in 
south-western California. 
Second, Ostrom (1990) claimed that her approach was not applicable in large-scale common-pool 
resource where there is no communication between users. This said, later on, she applied her 
approach to larger commons. Even though she did not work on aquifers in developing countries, she 
worked on global commons, such as climate change, which shows similarities with these aquifers in 
the absence of strong organisations able to enforce agreements and the high cost of enforcing 
regulations. She generally used the same approach, which involves attempting to limit free rider 
behaviours and building up polycentric governance systems, where users of the global commons 
remain actors at the lower levels of nested institutions (Ostrom, 2010). These two proposals are in 
stark contrast with that of Shah concerning relevant governance of informal groundwater 
economies.  
Convergences and divergences in heuristic approaches 
First, the approaches differ in terms of the contour of the system analysed. In the Bloomington 
school, the system considered is the water sector at large, taking into account surface and 
groundwater, quality and quantity issues, short term and long term, the wide range of stakeholders, 
etc. (an approach which is not so far from IWRM approaches). The two other approaches take a 
broader perspective, with, for instance, the inclusion of the energy-irrigation nexus or the local 
political scene, in that sense shifting from a “watershed” to a “problemshed” definition of the system 
(Mollinga et al., 2007).  
Second, the research programmes of Shah and of the Bloomington school are firmly anchored in 
institutional analysis and new institutional economics. Both aim at identifying certain regularities in 
the relation between the initial characteristics of the resources and the actors on the one hand, and 
the outcomes in terms of governance on the other. They attempt to achieve this by studying large 
sets of case studies. The three approaches also share an explicit interest in path dependency, but 
with very different definitions of the concept. The three authors drawing on political ecology focus 
on the way the negotiation processes lead to case-specific results, and states that the characteristics 
of the aquifer are not so important. As Mukherji (2006: 393) pointed out: “groundwater-related 
policies in India have very little to do with the scarcity, depletion or quality of groundwater, and 
more to do with rural politics manifested, among other things, in terms of the presence or absence of 
farmer lobbies”. It thus takes a position explicitly opposed to the above-mentioned ambitions of the 
two other research programmes. The Bloomington school also gives importance to path dependency 
(Blomquist, 1992; Steed, 2010) as a factor which explains the creation and sustainability of 
institutions to govern groundwater. Steed (2010) stated that institutional change is rather difficult to 
achieve, because of the weight of culture and informal institutions and because of the transaction 
costs it generates. Shah (2009) pointed to the weight of path dependency, but more from a long-
term perspective and considering the narratives used for groundwater governance, and not so much 
on the processes used to design groundwater governance in specific cases.  
Third, Shah and the three authors inspired by political ecology place much more importance on 
power relationships in groundwater governance than the Bloomington school. Moreover, the 
authors of the political ecology approach often use the Foucauldian concept of governmentality, i.e., 
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the state attempts to “conduct the conducts”. In particular, Birkenholtz (2009) studied the way the 
state aimed to influence groundwater use by influencing the ideas being debated and the 
behavioural norms concerning groundwater use. The interest paid by Shah to indirect management 
tools brings his approach surprisingly close to this concept of governmentality. Indeed, in a context 
where direct demand management is not possible, he looked at ways to indirectly influence the 
behaviours of farmers. The difference lies in the fact that the political approach places more 
importance on political or cognitive ways of influencing behaviours, while Shah focuses more on 
economic means. Such interest in governmentality is in stark contrast with the Bloomington school’s 
approach in which water users are invited to directly participate in the design of governance. Finally, 
Shah and the authors using the political ecology approach have studied much more than the 
Bloomington school what happens when governance fails, but with a difference: Shah looked at the 
evolution of the groundwater economy at territorial level, while authors using political ecology paid 
more attention to the impacts of the groundwater crisis at household and village levels. 
Contrasted proposals for supporting effective governance 
Both Ostrom’s and Shah’s approaches claimed to seek to link academic studies with more practical 
reflections (something that authors drawing on political ecology generally refrained from doing). 
However, their heuristic methods and research results led to differing theses on the components of 
effective governance and how to achieve it. In particular, both approaches cited the success stories 
they identified in their original case studies. Ostrom considered that resource users need to be fully 
involved in the definition of rules, and that the main role of the state should be the one played by the 
US Geological Survey in the design of south-western California groundwater basin governance, which 
was to facilitate and provide information to users so that they can reach agreement (1992). Ostrom’s 
criteria for rules for long-enduring systems have indeed reached a much wider audience than the 
academic community (WRD, 2009). By contrast, Shah (2009) called for the use of more indirect 
management tools and for attention to be paid to locally build informal institutions for groundwater 
access and management. It is important to make it clear that Shah criticizes traditional and formalist 
ways of implementing demand management, both in terms of the tools used and of the expectations 
that handing the issue to groundwater users will be sufficient for demand management to take place. 
Shah does not criticize involvement of groundwater users in the design of governance systems (even 
though it is not the focus of his analyses), as long as these users are not expected to participate in 
the implementation of these governance systems. As mentioned above, the question of the 
implementation of an effective governance system to manage groundwater is not the ambition of 
the group of scholars drawing on political ecology.  
 
CONCLUSIONS AND PERSPECTIVES  
The issue of groundwater governance has given birth to very rich and diverse analytical frameworks. 
The analysis we have undertaken here stresses the importance of the aquifers each author originally 
used to build his/her analysis. Since two of the approaches aimed to reach a wider audience, the 
historical link between the original cases studied and later broader framework needs to be made 
explicit so that other scholars who wish to use these frameworks understand the origin and rationale 
of each heuristic method.  
While the Bloomington school and Shah converge on the need for joint involvement of the various 
stakeholders in the design of groundwater governance, they clearly differ on the components of 
governance systems required to achieve sustainable groundwater use, and especially the benefits of 
involving users in the implementation of the governance systems. For that reason, and more 
importantly, they differ on what should be the focus of academic analyses. It may be thus of interest 
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to organize joint “readings” of groundwater governance, seen not so much as analytical results, but 
rather as processes to understand local situations. It would also be useful to discuss the content of 
research programs that enable fruitful reading of situations of groundwater governance based on 
local specificities. This could concern the choice of criteria to be analysed for assessing effective 
governance and those that influence the achievement of effective governance.  
 
These approaches have already evolved and will probably continue to do so, both in terms of the 
topics addressed and in terms of their analytical stand. With regards to the topics, all three 
approaches were historically based on quantitative aspects of groundwater governance. In Europe, 
groundwater overdraft problems have sometimes produced innovative solutions (e.g., Petit, 2009), 
but the issue of groundwater quality acquires increasing importance, and the indirect management 
approaches advocated by Shah will probably play a useful role in the management of agricultural 
pollution. Regarding the analytical stand, the notion of “adaptive management” of the governance 
system plays an increasingly important role in the analyses of the Bloomington school and Shah. The 
concept of adaptability, proposed by Blomquist (1992) as one of the performance indicators, is of 
fundamental importance in recent analyses of robust institutions (Blomquist and Ostrom, 2008; 
Steed, 2010). This idea echoes Shah’s assessment (2009: 209): “Transforming chaos into stability may 
prove impossible, but transforming inhumane anarchy into humane anarchy through adaptive 
approaches may be well within the realm of possibility”. Thus, studying the resilience of a 
groundwater territory, defined as a social ecological system, and assessing the adaptive nature of the 
governance processes implemented, is one of the issues that would probably benefit from a cross-
reading of the authors studied here.  
 
While scholars have long showed an interest in groundwater governance of specific cases, the 
worldwide development of groundwater use has, by and large, been a “silent revolution” (Lopez-
Gunn and Llamas, 2008). The situation is now changing in both developed and developing countries: 
in recent years, many management experiments have been conducted in new groundwater 
governance contexts which are not exactly the same as the cases on which the three approaches 
were historically built. Therefore, as much as there is an interest for more dynamic exchanges 
between authors using different approaches, it would be useful to increase documentation of the 
many on-going experiments around the world, to continue and strengthen the two-way link between 
theories and case study analyses, which is a core element in the interest and success of the three 
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